Objective 1.1 · Lesson 2 of 2

Connect trust, data, and physical impact

A network boundary does not explain who may use a service or what happens if it stops. Combine identity, data protection, and operational context before choosing a control.

Trace identity rather than assuming trust

Authentication establishes evidence about an identity; authorization decides which actions it may perform. Follow both human and workload identities across a request, including temporary credentials and role assumptions. Privileged access management (PAM) can restrict and audit elevated sessions. Secrets management controls the storage, retrieval, and rotation of passwords, keys, and tokens instead of embedding them in application files.

A zero trust approach evaluates access to a resource using identity, device, and other relevant context rather than trusting a request merely because it originates inside a network. Device management contributes inventory, configuration, and compliance information for endpoints and mobiles. A valid login from an unmanaged device can therefore require a different access decision from the same login on a managed laptop.

Find the protection boundary for each data flow

Hybrid cloud connects on-premises and cloud resources, creating several ownership and monitoring boundaries. Secure access service edge (SASE) brings networking and security capabilities together as a service model, but analysts still need to identify the actual inspection and enforcement points. Draw the route from user to application and note proxies, private links, service identities, and where logs are available.

Encryption in transit protects data travelling between endpoints; encryption at rest protects stored data under its key-management assumptions. Neither prevents an authorised application from disclosing plaintext after decryption. Combine encryption with classification, access restrictions, key separation, minimisation, and data-loss controls. Decide who may decrypt, export, and delete information, and log those actions where the risk warrants it.

Respect systems that operate the physical world

Operational technology monitors or controls physical processes. Industrial control systems sit within that environment, and SCADA systems provide supervisory monitoring and control across equipment or locations. Their security depends on availability, safe process behaviour, and engineering constraints as well as confidentiality. An unfamiliar device may be a production controller rather than an unmanaged office computer.

Coordinate discovery, monitoring, and changes with the operational owner. Passive observation and existing asset records may be safer starting points than an intrusive scan. Segmentation, controlled maintenance access, and monitored remote connections can limit exposure. When considering isolation or rebooting, ask what physical process depends on the device and who can verify a safe transition.

Keep these points in mind

  • Authentication success does not establish permission for every action.
  • Encryption needs access control and key governance to protect data.
  • Response choices for OT must account for physical consequences.

Pause and practise

A remote maintenance account reaches a packaging controller from an unregistered laptop. State three checks before changing access.

Show a worked response

Confirm the maintenance window and named owner, inspect identity and remote-access logs for the specific session, and ask the operations lead about safe intervention. Check device policy and the account’s allowed resources. If the session is unauthorised, use the agreed maintenance-access control with operational approval and verify that the process remains safe.

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